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ABSTRACT: 
International climate finance will continue increasing if the financial goal agreed in Copenhagen is to be 
reached. Apart from climate-related benefits, these monetary flows generate economic impacts via the 
purchase of goods and services. Due to international trade, impacts happen not only in recipient countries 
but also in other economies involved in the supply chain of these products. Countries differ in their ability 
to capture these economic benefits. We seek to clarify the factors underlying the differences between 
several recipient and donor countries by applying a structural decomposition analysis. We focus on specific 
climate actions, and quantify the contribution of four factors: value-added intensity, domestic multiplier, 
foreign multiplier and trade structure. Results point to the factors with the greatest potential to enhance the 
economic gains of climate finance in each country. This information is useful for the design of national 
strategies aimed at maximising synergies between climate action and development. 
1. INTRODUCTION
For many countries the lack of financial resources is a barrier to the successful implementation of an
appropriate mix of policies to mitigate climate change and its impacts. To enable a globally coordinated 
response to climate change, developed countries committed to jointly mobilize US dollar (USD) 100 billion 
per year by 2020 from a variety of sources to address developing countries’ needs in terms of climate action 
at the 15th Conference of Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). The Copenhagen Accord  contained this commitment, which is named Long-term Finance 
(UNFCCC, 2009). The decision 1/CP.21 accompanying the Paris Agreement urges developed countries to 
increase their level of financial support, with a concrete roadmap for achieving the commitment made in 
Copenhagen (UNFCCC, 2015). This decision upholds the USD 100 billion target from 2020 to 2025, and 
specifies that it will then review that collective target upwards. 
Since the negotiation of the UNFCCC in 1992, the number of climate change funds that channel 
climate finance has increased rapidly. Today, there are around 100 international public funds, including the 
Global Environment Facility, the Adaptation Fund, the Climate Investment Funds and the Green Climate 
Fund (GCF), as well as a great number of private funds. The GCF, whose creation was agreed in the Cancun 
Agreements of the 16th COP in 2010, was conceived as the main channel for the Long-term Finance 
commitment (UNFCCC, 2010). As for December 2016, it had mobilized USD 10.3 billion and had started 
its support activities in developing countries (GCF, 2016). The Organization for Economic Co-operation 








subject), estimated that in the period 2013–2014 developed countries mobilized USD 57 billion per year on 
average for climate action in developing countries (71% from public sources) (OECD and CPI, 2015).  
In the academic literature, the concept of climate finance is used to refer to climate-related financial 
flows within or between countries that are dedicated to both mitigation and adaptation (Glemarec, 2011; 
van Melle et al., 2011). The growing body of literature on climate finance has already explored different 
aspects and implications of this topic. Some researchers have focused on tracking the progress towards the 
quantitative goal of USD 100 billion per year, characterizing the landscape of climate finance (sources, 
channels, instruments, recipients and uses) and analysing climate funds (Amin, 2015; Buchner et al., 2011, 
2013, 2014, 2015; Fridahl and Linnér, 2015; Schalatek et al., 2015). Others have provided quantitative 
estimates of the volume of financial resources required for financing the transition to a low-carbon resilient 
world (UNEP, 2014b, 2014a).  
Using theoretical models of coalition formation, other authors have analysed the role of financial 
transfers between developed and developing countries as side payments to encourage participation in an 
international agreement for climate change (Barrett, 2009; Barrett and Stavins, 2003; Benchekroun et al., 
2011; Marrouch and Ray Chaudhuri, 2011; de Zeeuw, 2015). Empirical models (e.g. Computable General 
Equilibrium or Integrated Assessment Models) have also been used to estimate the magnitude of North-to-
South transfers that would enable such international climate agreement (Bowen et al., 2015; Tian and 
Whalley, 2010).  
Another stream of the literature deals with the assessment of alternative options for the mobilization 
of climate finance. This group includes studies that, from formal and non-formal approaches, analyse 
welfare effects and fairness implications of different mobilization schemes (Buchholz and Peters, 2007; 
Buob and Stephan, 2013; Grasso, 2010; Heuson et al., 2012; Hof et al., 2011; Pickering et al., 2015; Pittel 
and Rübbelke, 2013; Rübbelke, 2011; Schenker and Stephan, 2014; Urpelainen, 2012a). Finally, other 
studies have dealt with climate finance effectiveness, studying the conditions required for climate finance 
to be effective (Bird and Brown, 2010; Chaum et al., 2011; Joffe et al., 2013; Michaelowa, 2012; 
Urpelainen, 2012b; Vandeweerd et al., 2012).  
The present paper seeks to contribute to this body of literature by studying the factors that determine 
the size and spatial distribution of the economic benefits of climate finance. Even though it is not its purpose 
(climate finance aims at enabling climate action in recipient countries), climate finance generates an 
economic impact inasmuch as disbursements are used in the implementation of mitigation and adaptation 
actions. As in developed countries the fight against climate change has been seen as an opportunity for the 
development of a green economy able to generate economic growth and employment (see, for example, 
Mundaca et al., 2016), likewise the disbursements of climate finance can contribute to the economic 
progress of developing countries (as described in Román et al., 2016). 
In this paper, we focus on North-to-South financial flows enabling the implementation of mitigation 
and/or adaptation actions (including measures, projects or programmes) in the recipient country. Our 
analysis is centred on the effects of disbursements of climate finance, independently of the channel (bilateral 








Value-added creation, which reflects the remuneration of primary production factors (i.e. labour and 
capital), was used in this study as a measure of the economic benefits of a particular intervention. In our 
case, the intervention studied consists of climate finance disbursements generating new demand for goods 
and services. In order to respond to this new demand, industries involved in the production of these goods 
and services pay employees and capital owners, creating value-added. The entire amount of financial 
resources transferred to the recipient country is finally transformed into value-added in different countries 
of the world to remunerate the production factors involved. The proportion of the value-added created that 
is domestically retained is referred to as the local economic impact of climate finance. The remainder 
constitutes the spillover effect resulting from international trade. 1  
The geographic distribution of value-added creation differs depending on where climate finance is 
disbursed. In a previous paper (ibid), we quantified the domestic impact and spillovers of different types of 
climate actions for different countries. The present paper supplements this previous research by explaining 
the observed differences between countries’ ability to capture economic impacts. In order to do this, we 
apply the Structural Decomposition Analysis (SDA), a technique that is based on Input−Output tables..  
This methodology has extensively been used in climate change literature to quantify the contribution of 
different factors to the growth in greenhouse gas emissions, and to assess the outsourcing of emissions 
phenomenon and carbon footprints  (as Lenzen, 2016 explains). But to the best of our knowledge, it has not 
been applied to explain the contribution of climate finance to countries’ economies.  
With this work we seek to bring to light the relative importance of the factors that determine the scale 
of the value-added created for both donors and recipients of climate finance disbursements. Our specific 
research questions are the following: (1) What factors determine the magnitude of the economic impact of 
climate finance? (2) What is the contribution of each factor to the differences between countries’ ability to 
capture economic impacts? (3) Which industries offer the highest potential for increasing the economic 
impact of climate finance in each country?  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the methodology; Section 3 contains 
the results at both aggregated and sectoral levels; Section 4 discusses the main outcomes and contains some 
conclusions. 
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
To quantify the contribution of each factor in explaining the differences between countries in the scale 
of value-added impact, we apply a SDA within a Global Multi−Regional Input−Output (GMRIO) 
framework. This technique is normally used to decompose changes in a variable over time. For example, 
Xu and Dietzenbacher (2014) and Arto and Dietzenbacher (2014) used this method to identify the factors 
driving the change in greenhouse gas emissions by comparing different years. Like Alcántara and Duarte  
(2004) de Nooij et al. (2003) and Hasegawa (2006) we perform a spatial SDA, which consists on comparing 
different locations with data for the same year.  
                                                          
1 Note that the economic effects referred to in this paper are those generated by the use of climate finance. Other authors 
have studied the economic consequences of the mobilization of financial resources (Basu et al., 2011; IMF, 2011; Jones 








The main data source for our analysis is the World Input−Output Database (WIOD) for the year 2011 
(Timmer et al., 2012). 2 As regards climate finance recipient countries, we consider the five developing 
countries for which data are available in the WIOD: India, Brazil, China, Indonesia and Mexico. This set 
of recipient countries represents around 60% of the emissions as well as GDP of developing countries in 
2011, according to the World Bank Indicators. As regards climate finance donor countries, we consider the 
four main contributors to bilateral and multilateral climate funds for which data are available in the WIOD: 
Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), Japan and the United States of America (USA). This set of countries 
represents 62% of the total contributions to climate funds pledged as for October 2016, according to the 
Climate Funds Update (2016). 3The information in these tables (transactions between industries, purchases 
of end products, remuneration of labour and capital and total output of each industry in each country in 
monetary terms), enables us to trace value-added creation associated with a specific demand shock back to 
the country where it is created.  
Our exercise is based on the assumption that climate finance, once disbursed in a recipient country, 
results in the expenditures required for a certain intervention with mitigation and/or adaptation purposes. 
We denote such intervention as “climate action”, and introduce it in the Input-Output model as an 
exogenous demand shock. In order to account for different types of mitigation and adaptation options, we 
define six categories of climate actions. For each of them we define a demand shock of the same magnitude 
but with a different composition of products (or cost structure), depending on the requirements of the 
specific type of intervention. The cost structure of one climate action consists of a specific distribution of 
the budget between the different industries in the economy. Figure 1 illustrates the cost structures of climate 
actions considered in this paper. For example, while 100% of the expenditures in building insulation consist 
of construction services, when climate finance is spent in wind power generation, expenditures are shared 
out between several sectors: 49% for machinery, 19% for metals and other minerals, 13% for other business 
activities, 3% for construction and 16% for other industries. 
[FIGURE 1] 
The types of climate action studied include the most widely used renewable energy technologies 
worldwide: onshore wind, solar thermal and hydropower. Data used in previous studies (Lehr et al., 2008, 
2012), reflecting the cost structures of projects in Germany in 2011, are used to define the cost structures 
of these types of climate action. Another mitigation action studied is energy efficiency measures in 
buildings (i.e. building insulation). Data for defining the cost structure of building insulation are taken from 
Markaki et al. (2013).  Finally, different adaptation actions are also considered. For the sake of tractability 
of results, adaptation options are grouped into hard and soft adaptation. Table B.1 in the Supplementary 
Material contains all the adaptation measures considered and the sources of information used, which are 
specific Priority Project Profile documents from National Adaptation Programmes of Action (UNFCCC, 
                                                          
2 For a detailed description of the WIOD project, the WIOT (World Input-Output Tables) and main weaknesses see 
also Dietzenbacher at al. (2013) and Timmer et al. (2015). 








2014). 4 The cost structure for hard and soft adaptation is the average cost structure of the selected projects.  
Since some sources of information report budget allocations in terms of commodities, the correspondence 
reported in Table B.2 of the Supplementary Material is used to express cost structures in terms of industries. 
We use the same classification as the WIOD (CPA-NACE) in order to connect this information with the 
GMRIO framework. 5  
The production induced by demand shocks initiates a sequence of requirements of intermediate goods 
and services, and value-added generation across different industries and countries. All these relations can 
be captured by a GMRIO model as described next. 
Let be  
-1
ˆ=r r rv x w  the vector of value-added coefficients, where 
r
x is the column vector of gross 
outputs in country r,  
-1
ˆ rx is the inverse of the diagonal matrix of this vector and w
r is a column vector 
of value-added in country r with elements 
r
iw  indicating the value-added created in each sector i of that 
country; 
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Z is the matrix of intermediate inputs from country r to country s, with elements 
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ijz indicating 









L I A  is the Leontief inverse matrix, where I  is an identity matrix of the appropriate 
dimension; 
st
f  is the column vector with final demand, with elements 
st
jf  indicating the final demand in 
country t for products of sector j produced by country s. We can calculate the fraction of the total final 
demand in country t for commodities of sector j imported from country s (when s t ) or domestically 











. The column vector 
st
t indicates the trade structure of country t.  
Finally, we define 
a
e  as the column vector of the demand shock, with elements 
a
je  indicating the 
proportion of the total expenditure on a specific climate action a spent in sector j.  
With these elements we can calculate the value-added created in country r as a consequence of the 
implementation of climate action a in the recipient country t as  
<equation 1>  
where  denotes the Hadamard product (i.e. the element by element multiplication). This expression 
shows the value-added of country r as the product of a series of factors. 
Once the local value-added derived from climate finance in each country is calculated, the country   
with greatest impact is identified as the benchmark against which other countries are compared. Within the 
                                                          
4 The choice of adaptation actions is based on categorizations of previous studies (Blazejczak et al., 2014; Buchner et 
al., 2013; OECD/IEA, 2014; Prowse and Snilstveit, 2010; REN21, 2014). 
5 CPA is the statistical classification of products by activity, and each CPA product is related to activities defined by 








recipient countries group, the benchmark is the country that is able to retain the largest part of the total 
value-added created. Donor countries are compared to the country able to attract the largest proportion of 
spillover effects.  
Thus, the difference in the value-added created by the implementation of climate action a in country t 
between two countries: B (the benchmark) and C (each of the rest of countries in the group) is given by the 
following expression:  
<equation 2> 




Next, we illustrate the functioning of the SDA with the case of two factors (as explained by Arto and 
Dietzenbacher, 2014). Let be xa  the value of a variable a  in country x . Let us assume that a  is defined 
as the product of two exogenous parameters: x x xa b c . The difference in a  between country A and 
country B is  
<equation 5> 




Dietzenbacher and Los (1998), also discuss that a  can be expressed as the average of these two 
decompositions.  
<equation 8> 
Equation 8 expresses the difference in a  as the sum of the contribution of each factor ( b and c ) to 
the difference in a . 
We can operate in Equations 3 and 4 in order to decompose the differences in the value-added as the 
sum of a series of factors. 6  
For instance, for the case of recipients, and following Dietzenbacher and Los (1998), expression 3 can 
be decomposed as the average of the two polar decompositions,  1 21w Δ +Δ2 
a a aw w , where  
                                                          
6 For the sake of simplicity we just show the differences in recipient countries; the procedure to compare donor 














Thus, the average of the polar decomposition is  
<equation 14>. 
The second and third terms of Equation 14 can be further decomposed. The resulting expression is 
<equation 15>. 
Expression 15 decomposes the difference in the value-added generated in donor countries as the sum 





- VAiE is the value-added intensity effect, which reflects differences in value-added per unit of domestic 
output. A positive (negative) VAiE means that the benchmark country (B) produces more (less) value-
added per unit of output than the studied country (C). High value-added intensities are typical in 
countries specialised in the production of high technology commodities that require high-skilled 
labour. 
- DME is the domestic multiplier effect, which reflects differences in domestic production per unit of 
domestic demand. A positive (negative) DME means that the amount of production generated in B per 
unit of demand of goods/services produced in B is bigger (smaller) than the amount of production 
generated in C per unit of demand of goods/services produced in C. High domestic multipliers are 
typical of highly integrated economies, characterised by the presence of industrial clusters for different 
commodities that are relatively independent of foreign production. 
- FME is the foreign multiplier effect, which reflects differences in domestic production per unit of 
demand of foreign products. A positive (negative) FME means that the amount of production generated 
in B per unit of goods/services produced in other countries is bigger (smaller) than the amount of 
production generated in C per unit of goods/services produced in other countries. High foreign 
multiplier effects are typical of countries that participate in global supply chains for many products and 
services.  
- TSE is the trade structure effect, which reflects differences in the demand of domestic products 








action is similar for all recipient countries in terms of level and composition of commodities. But we 
take into account that the origin of the commodities varies depending on the recipient country. A 
positive (negative) TSE means that the demand of goods/services produced in B generated by the 
implementation of a particular climate action is larger (smaller) than the demand of goods/services 
produced in C generated by the implementation of the same action in C. In the case of recipient 
countries, this is the effect of the degree of dependency on final goods and services produced abroad, 
something that is related to the size of the country. In the case of donors, this is the effect of the 
penetration of their final products on the recipient countries’ markets. 
 
3. RESULTS 
This section includes general considerations that apply to all the results. Results are then grouped into 
two subsections according to their level of detail. Aggregated results for each economy are presented first, 
followed by results at industry level. Results for climate finance recipient countries distinguish between the 
types of climate action implemented. In the case of donor countries the focus is exclusively on renewable 
energy technologies, since these are the climate actions that yield the largest spillover effects (Román et 
al., 2016). However, since the volume of spillovers varies widely depending on the country receiving 
climate finance, results distinguish between the destinations of climate finance. 7  
Results reflect the comparison between the benchmark country and each of the other countries in the 
group. Amongst recipient countries, the benchmark varies depending on the climate action implemented. 
Amongst countries benefiting from spillovers, the benchmark varies depending on the country receiving 
climate finance. Table 1 shows the proportion of the impact retained by each recipient country, the 
proportion attracted by each donor country and the benchmark country in each case. 8  
For example, we see that out of every USD 100 spent in wind energy in India, USD 72 stay within the 
country (in the form of wages or benefits of Indian companies). The rest goes to other countries participating 
in the production of final goods/services or intermediate inputs required for the wind power project. 
However, the same expenditure in Mexico would leave in the country only USD 44. The decomposition 
explains what drives the difference of USD 28 between India and Mexico. In the case of donors, we see 
that out of every USD 100 spent in mitigation projects in Mexico, USD 20 end up in the USA as wages or 
companies’ profits, due to their participation in the production of the inputs of the project. Japan, however, 
only receives three dollars. The decomposition shows the contribution of each of the four factors considered 
to this USD 17 difference.  
                                                          
7 The SDA of spillovers depends on which country is the donor, which one is the recipient and what type of climate 
action is implemented. This three-fold dependency complicates the presentation and interpretation of results. We 
therefore concentrate on renewable energy technologies, because they are the actions that yield the largest spillovers 
for donors, and present average results for wind, hydropower and solar.   
8 Note that China is the benchmark country against which donor countries are compared in the case of climate finance 









Since benchmark countries are determined based on the economic impact at country level, aggregated 
results show always positive differences between the benchmark and other countries. This is not necessarily 
the case for results at industry level, where both positive and negative differences might appear. At both 
levels, the sign of the different effects (i.e. VAiE, DME, FME and TSE) can be either positive or negative, 
depending on whether they contribute positively to the dominant effect or counteract it. In other words, 
positive effects help explaining why benchmarks are benchmarks, and negative effects explain why 
differences between benchmarks and other countries are not even larger.  
[TABLE 1] 
3.1. Aggregated Results  
In this section, the results for each climate finance recipient country are shown first, followed by results 
for each donor country. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the results for recipient and donor countries. To explain 
the content of Figure 2 we continue with the previous example: the USD 28 of difference between the 
domestic impact in India and Mexico is because the trade structure generates USD 19 more in India (Figure 
2(b)) than in Mexico (Figure 2(e)), the domestic multiplier generates USD 12 more in India than in Mexico 
and the value-added intensity generates three dollars more in Mexico than in India 
Brazil (Figure 2(a)) is the benchmark for all types of climate action except wind power and 
hydropower, for which the largest local economic benefits happen in India. However, Brazil is very close 
to the benchmark even there, with a local impact that is only one percentage point (pp) lower in the case of 
hydropower and two percentage points lower in the case of wind power. In both cases, the effects that 
contribute positively to the difference are the domestic multiplier and the trade structure effects. 
Counteracting these two factors is the effect of the value-added intensity.  
India (Figure 2(b)) is the benchmark for wind power and hydropower but is surpassed by Brazil in the 
rest of climate actions, with a difference of two percentage points for soft adaptation, three percentage 
points for solar and hard adaptation and eight percentage points for building insulation. In most cases (with 
the exception of soft adaptation), the effect of value-added intensity contributes to the difference while the 
effect of the domestic multiplier acts in the opposite direction.  
China (Figure 2(c)) is between one  and nine percentage points from the benchmark countries, 
depending on the climate action. The largest differences are for building insulation and soft adaptation (nine  
and eight percentage points, respectively). But we see as a common pattern for all climate actions that 
differences with the benchmark are the result of two contrary and sizeable forces: a positive value-added 
intensity effect (that surpasses 20 pp) and a negative domestic multiplier effect (almost of the same 
magnitude). 
Indonesia (Figure 2(d)) is farther from the benchmarks (between 10 and 23 pp), with the largest 
differences being found in renewable energy technologies (13-23 pp). In these cases, three factors 
contribute positively to the difference: mainly the effect of the trade structure, but also those of the domestic 








effect of the value-added intensity, which is partially offset by the domestic multiplier effect. In the case of 
adaptation actions, the dominant effects are the value-added intensity and the trade structure effects.  
[FIGURE 2] 
Mexico (Figure 2(e)) is the farthest from benchmark countries: between 9-30 pp. Again, the largest 
differences are for renewable energy technologies (21-30 pp), and the lowest for building insulation (9 pp). 
This time the dominant effect in most cases is the trade structure, with the domestic multiplier as the other 
factor that contributes to the difference. In most cases, the value-added intensity also counteracts these 
former effects. The case of building insulation is different, with the trade structure having no influence, and 
both the domestic multiplier and the value-added intensity contributing positively to the difference. Note 
that the effect of the foreign multiplier does not appear as a relevant factor in explaining the differences in 
the domestic economic impact of climate finance between recipient countries. 
To explain the results contained in Figure 3, we continue with the previous example: the USD 17 of 
difference between spillovers captured by the USA and Japan from a mitigation project in Mexico are 
because the Mexican trade structure generates USD 12 more for the USA (Figure 3(d)) than for Japan 
(Figure 3(c)), the foreign multiplier creates four dollars  more in the USA than in Japan, the higher value-
added intensity of American production produces two dollars of difference, and the domestic multiplier 
generates one dollar more in Japan than in the USA. 
Spillovers attracted by Germany (Figure 3(a)) are only one percentage point lower than those attracted 
by the benchmark country (Japan) when the recipient country is China. The difference rises to 17 pp when 
the recipient country is Mexico (the benchmark country is the USA in this case). In general, the dominant 
factor is the trade structure. Two other factors that also contribute positively to the difference are the 
domestic and foreign multipliers. Finally, the only factor that counteracts those effects is the value-added 
intensity, showing that this is generally larger in the German production than in benchmark countries (with 
the exception of the USA). The same happens with the UK (Figure 3(b)), whose results are very similar. 
Differences are slightly larger in the case of the UK (between 3 pp and 19 pp), but the signs and relative 
magnitude of the different factors are the same than for Germany. 
Japan (Figure 3(c)) is the benchmark country when China receives funding for deploying renewable 
energy technologies. In other cases, spillovers captured by Japan are between 3 pp and 17 pp lower than 
those captured by the benchmark country: the average is four percentage points when then benchmark 
country is China and 17 pp when it is the USA. Again, the dominant factor is the trade structure. The foreign 
multiplier also contributes positively to the difference. The signs of the other two factors differ depending 
on the benchmark country: when it is China, the effect of the domestic multiplier increases the difference 
and the value-added intensity effect decreases it; when it is the USA, the opposite occurs.  
The USA (Figure 3(d)) is the benchmark when Mexico is the recipient country. In other cases 
differences with the benchmark countries do not exceed five percentage points. The most relevant factors 
are the trade structure and value-added intensity. This latter counteracting the rest of the effects, something 









3.2. Sectoral Results  
A small group of sectors concentrates the main effects in the countries analysed: “Mining and 
Quarrying”, “Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal”, “Machinery n.e.c.”, “Electrical and Optical Equipment”, 
“Electricity, Gas and Water Supply”, “Construction”, “Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of 
Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles”, “Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of 
Household Goods”, “Inland Transport”, “Financial Intermediation” and “Other Business Activities” . 9 
Figure B.1 in the Supplementary Material illustrates the results for recipients and donor countries. 
In Brazil (Figure B.1(a)), the largest positive differences with the benchmark (India) appear in trade 
sectors (due to the effect of value-added intensity, the domestic multiplier and the trade structure) and the 
transport sector (especially due to the domestic multiplier). The sectors with the largest negative differences 
(around -2 pp) are metals and electricity, gas and water supply (in wind and hydropower, respectively), 
especially due to the negative effect of the value-added intensity. 
When comparing India (Figure B.1(b)) to the benchmark (Brazil), the most relevant difference at 
aggregated level is found in building insulation projects. This result can be explained by the large difference 
(16 pp) in the construction sector, associated with the value-added intensity. This effect in the construction 
sector may also explain the differences in solar and hard adaptation. Negative differences appear in metals, 
retail trade and transport for building insulation projects. These negative differences are generally driven 
by the domestic multiplier.  
Sectoral results for China (Figure B.1(c)) show that the differences observed in building insulation 
projects are associated with the construction sector (34 pp). The differences in soft adaptation are due to 
the other business activities sector (13 pp), and those observed in hard adaptation are due to both the 
construction and other business activities sectors (around 8 pp each). These differences are a consequence 
of a positive effect of the value-added intensity. Also noteworthy is the positive domestic multiplier effect 
in the retail trade sector regardless of the type of action. This effect is negative at the aggregated level due 
to sectors such as metals and equipment. 
In Indonesia (Figure B.1(d)), metals and machinery sectors contribute to the large difference in 
renewable energy projects, especially due to the effect of the domestic multiplier in the former and the 
effect of the trade structure in the latter. The difference observed in building insulation projects might be 
explained in part by the value-added intensity in the construction sector. This effect in this sector might 
also influence the aggregated results in solar and hard adaptation projects. The value-added intensity in 
other business activities and the trade structure in machinery influence the differences in adaptation 
projects. This latter effect in the machinery sector contributes to the positive difference in all types of action 
except for building insulation. Notable negative differences are observed in the mining sector (up to 9 pp) 
                                                          








regardless of the type of action, as a consequence of the effects of the domestic multiplier and the value-
added intensity.     
According to the sectoral results, the trade structure in the machinery sector contributes to the 
differences observed for renewable energy projects in Mexico (Figure B.1(e)). Actually, this effect in this 
sector contributes to the difference in all types of project except for building insulation. Other sectors, such 
as metals, equipment and financial intermediation, also contribute to the difference in renewable energy 
actions due to the trade structure and the domestic multiplier. In this type of action, the role of the value-
added intensity is negative with the exception of the equipment sector. In adaptation actions, the most 
influential effect is the trade structure in machinery. Regarding negative differences, the other business 
activities sector stands out, especially due to the value-added intensity in adaptation projects.  
Three sectors concentrate the most significant effects in explaining differences between donor 
countries: “Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal”, “Machinery n.e.c” and “Electrical and Optical 
Equipment”. In the case of Germany (Figure B.1(f)), the trade structure of these three sectors is especially 
influential, particularly when the benchmark countries are China and the USA. The UK (Figure B.1(g)) and 
Japan (Figure B.1(h)) present very similar results regarding the relative importance of sectors and the signs 
of effects. The case of the USA (Figure B.1(i)) is also similar, but with some noteworthy features such as 
the negative effect of the value-added intensity on the equipment and machinery sector, especially when 
the benchmark country is China.  
4. DISCUSSION  
One of the reasons why Brazil, out of all the recipient countries considered in the analysis, is the one 
where climate finance produces the largest domestic impact in most cases (i.e. for solar energy, building 
insulation and adaptation projects) is the value-added intensity. According to the sectoral results, this effect 
makes the impact of mitigation actions especially larger in the Brazilian metals, electricity, gas and water 
supply, and construction sectors. Table 2, which shows value-added coefficients by country and sector, 
confirms that these sectors are relatively more intensive in primary inputs in Brazil than in the other 
recipient countries, which might be due to a higher level of sophistication in the production and the use of 
high technology and skilled labour. An alternative (or complementary) explanation for higher value-added 
per unit of output is a higher degree of protectionism in the economy. In fact, Brazil ranks at the bottom of 
the ICC open markets index for the year of study (ICC, 2011), behind the other recipient countries. 10 Thus, 
the high values of value-added per unit of output might also be due to a lack of competition with foreign 
producers, who find barriers to entry into Brazilian markets. The high value-added coefficient in the 
Brazilian electricity, gas and water supply sector may be associated with the large share of hydropower in 
the Brazilian energy mix, an energy source with low requirements for intermediate inputs.  
[TABLE 2] 
                                                          









When climate finance is spent on wind or hydropower projects, India is the recipient country with the 
largest domestic impact. According to our results, this is mainly due to the fact that India imports less final 
products than other recipient countries for undertaking such projects. According to the sectoral results, this 
effect means that the impact of these projects in the machinery industry is larger in India than in other 
recipient countries. Table 3, which shows the share of domestic production per industry in the final demand 
of recipient countries, confirms that India is, on average, the recipient country with the largest share of 
domestic production in its final demand. India has also a high level of self-sufficiency in machinery, 
equipment and transport equipment, the main components of this type of projects. Moreover, demand for 
Indian products triggers greater domestic production (especially in the metals and transport sectors) than in 
other countries. Both effects reflect the high level of self-sufficiency and integration of the Indian economy, 
a relatively well developed, independent industrial base and the existence of intraregional communication 
and transport networks.  
China is the other side of the coin compared to Brazil: a lower weight of labour and capital in the total 
production costs of Chinese industries is the main reason why China is not able to retain a larger proportion 
of the impact of climate finance. According to sectoral results, the value-added intensity makes the impact 
of climate actions in the Chinese metals, construction and other business activities sectors lower than in the 
benchmark cases. Table 3 confirms that China is the recipient country with the smallest value-added 
coefficients in almost all industries, including these three.  
Indonesia and Mexico are even farther away from the benchmarks than China, as a result of a 
combination of factors. First, both countries import a large part of their final demand. Sectoral results show 
relevant differences in the impact of renewable energy and adaptation projects in the metals and machinery 
sectors due to this effect. Table 3 confirms that these two countries are (on average and also in these two 
sectors) the recipient countries which depend most on others countries’ end products. Another factor that 
contributes to the lower impact of renewable energy projects is the fact that domestic demand generates 
less domestic production in the metals industry (i.e. metals required for domestic production are also more 
frequently imported).  
The salient feature of Indonesia is the domestic multiplier effect of the mining sector, which reduces 
the difference with the benchmark in the cases of renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. This 
reflects the fact that Indonesia is relatively self-sufficient in this sector. According to PwC (2014), the 
mining sector was very important in the Indonesian economy in 2011, accounting for 19.5% of the GDP. 
In Mexico, the salient feature is value-added per unit of output, especially in the metals and other business 
activities sectors (see Table 2). This factor reduces the difference with the benchmark for renewable energy 
and adaptation projects. 
Major differences in the distribution of spillovers of renewable energy projects appear when other 
donors are compared with the USA, the benchmark country when climate finance is disbursed in Mexico. 
According to our results, the main driver of these large differences is trade in both final and intermediate 
commodities. As Table 3 shows, Mexico is relatively dependent on others countries’ production to meet its 








market, explains the significance of trade in end products (i.e. the effect of the trade structure). The 
relevance of trade in intermediate inputs (i.e. the effect of the foreign multiplier) is due to two facts: first, 
regional trade facilitated by proximity and trade treaties (i.e. North American Free Trade Agreement) also 
benefits the USA indirectly (i.e. via Mexican imports of Canadian products that require American 
intermediate inputs); and second, American industries are well positioned in global markets, which enables 
them to participate in global supply chains and capture a share of the economic benefits generated from 
consumption in many parts of the world. 11 According to the World Bank, in 2011 the USA was the top 
market for world exports and the second exporting country (World Bank, 2011). Results also show that the 
USA is the donor that creates most value-added per unit of output, followed by Germany and the UK. Japan 
is in the last place in this aspect. Note that this ranking is in line with the average value-added coefficients 
contained in Table 2.  
[TABLE 3] 
The fact that the largest spillover effects when the recipient is China take place in Japan also reflects 
the effect of proximity in trade. However, the fact that China attracts spillovers between three and eight 
percentage points larger than any donor country when finance is disbursed in Brazil, Indonesia and India 
cannot be explained by geographic proximity. However, the prominent position of China in global trade - 
in 2011 it was the world’s number one exporter and number two importer, according to the World Bank 
(2011) - might provide an explanation for this result.  
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The main aim of this paper is disentangling the underlying factors explaining the different abilities of 
countries for deriving economic benefits from climate finance. Regarding developing countries, our results 
show that in those countries where the industries involved in mitigation and adaptation projects are well 
developed and connected, and offer competitive products and services with a high content of value-added, 
climate actions deliver larger economic benefits to the local population. This finding indicates that active 
policies to facilitate the local development of such industries would deliver climate and development 
benefits at the same time.  
Some researchers have suggested that there is a need to align climate finance and development finance, 
and that the effectiveness of climate finance depends on the capability of developing countries to manage 
the available sources of finance in favour of their national development strategies and needs (Haites, 2014; 
IPCC, 2014). Theoretical and empirical studies have suggested that climate action and development 
strategies might be complementary provided that climate change is considered in the design of development 
policies (Andreoni and Miola, 2014; Chambwera et al., 2014; Fankhauser and McDermott, 2014; Halsnæs 
and Verhagen, 2007). Here, we support this idea and identify three areas of action where governments of 
developing countries can focus in order to exploit this complementarity: 1) the value-added content (skilled 
                                                          
11 In the comparison of recipient countries, the foreign multiplier represents a feedback effect: the recipient country 
imports final goods and services that require intermediate inputs from the recipient country. According to our results, 








labour and high technology) of production; 2) the integration of the economy; and 3) the degree of self-
sufficiency in climate-related industries. 
In the case of donor countries, the first two recommendations also apply. Moreover, our analysis shows 
that trade interconnections with recipient countries increase the ability of countries to capture spillovers. 
Based on these findings, donors could be tempted to focus climate aid on their specific commercial area. 
An alternative strategy would be to increase participation in global supply chains of high-quality products 
and services related to the fight against climate change. This would enable them to profit from global 
climate action regardless of where it takes place, and from climate finance flows regardless of who 
mobilises them. Thus, our findings suggest that countries which seek to benefit from spillovers of climate 
action could promote globally competitive industries in the sectors involved in climate action.  
Summarizing, this exercise provides an evidence of the compatibility of climate action with economic 
gains. Our results suggest that both donors and recipient countries should strategically direct their 
development towards climate-related industries with high value-added content if they want to enjoy from 
larger shares of the economic benefits associated to the increasing amounts of climate finance. This is a 
very relevant message, since the search for short-term economic co-benefits of climate action could 
promote the (currently still lacking) coordination of countries for the development of solutions for this 
global environmental problem.   
Our paper also shows that the study of the economic impact of climate finance provides useful insights 
for the consecution of one of the objectives of the Paris Agreement regarding climate finance: the design 
of country-driven strategies, having into account the priorities and needs of developing countries e. Given 
that development is one of the priorities of these countries, information on the potential economic co-
benefits of alternative climate-related measures (and guidance about how to improve that potential) 
facilitates the design of such country-driven strategies.  
With enhanced country ownership of climate-related plans, effectiveness of climate finance would also 
improve, as recognized by the IPCC (2014). Developed countries have recently stressed that it is more 
efficient and effective to integrate climate action in programmes that generate wider development results 
(UK Government and Australian Government, 2016). For that reason, they have committed to support 
developing countries in the preparation of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs) consistent with their national development plans. 12 Our findings might be used in 
the design of such plans, with the objective of aligning them with development objectives, enhancing at the 
same time the effectiveness of climate finance in terms of mitigation and adaptation outcomes.  
We conclude that GMRIO models have great potential to contribute to discussions on the global 
climate regime. So far they have provided interesting insights on the topic of responsibility with evidences 
of carbon footprint and leakage. With this paper we explore a different avenue of research that focuses on 
the opportunities of the required transition towards decarbonized and resilient societies. In future studies, 
                                                          







GMRIO could be used to complement this assessment of value-added benefits with the estimation of the 
mitigation potential of financed climate actions.  
Finally, a remark is required on the main limitation of this exercise, which lies on the assumptions 
required to determine the demands of different categories of actions for the sectors of the economy. Profiles 
for expenditure on mitigation actions are taken from the existing literature, and the characterisation of 
adaptation actions is the result of an ad-hoc selection process from the NAPAs available on the UNFCCC 
website. The subsequent grouping into two main categories of adaptation (soft and hard) via the calculation 
of the corresponding averages means neglecting some degree of variation. In particular, the largest standard 
deviations are associated with expenses in the construction and machinery sectors (34% and 18% for 
construction in hard and soft adaptation, respectively; 27% and 17% for machinery in hard and soft 
adaptation, respectively). Bearing in mind that adaptation actions are as varied as countries’ adaptation 
needs, the results of this study provide an estimate of the impact of the “typical” or “average” soft and hard 
adaptation actions.   
The cost structures used in this exercise may differ from the real ones, depending on where and when 
each climate action takes place. This happens because many factors affecting the cost structures, such as 
the price of raw materials, the labour costs and the maturity of technologies vary over time and space. 13 
Nevertheless, and given that the ultimate objective of the present study is to provide general policy advice, 
extrapolating the cost structures of projects in certain countries may constitute a first step. For specific case 
studies, detailed data at project level should be used in future applications of this methodology.  
We are also aware of the remarkable differences between the countries considered. The comparison 
we propose, based on the national accounts and international trade statistics brings to light their differences 
in terms of size, trade liberalization, economic integration, productive specialization, competitiveness, etc. 
Results reflect the consequences of these differences and serve to identify where the largest improvement 
potentials lie. Future studies could elaborate further on the concrete strategies that each country could 
pursue taking into account limiting factors such as institutional or cultural conditions, natural resources 
availability or geographical location. 
   
                                                          
13 Note that the local content is site specific in our exercise. Trade structures representing the origin of the products 
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